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Abstract
It is shown how environmental decoherence plays an essential and
constructive role in a quantum mechanical theory of brain process that
has significant explanatory power.
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1. Introduction
In a recent article with the same title as this one Max Tegmark[1] es-
timated how long it would take for interactions with the environment to
destroy macroscopic quantum coherence in the brain. He arrived at the re-
sult 10−23 seconds. This tiny value appears, on the face of it, to rule out any
significant role for macroscopic quantum effects in understanding the con-
nection between brain processes and conscious thoughts. Indeed, Tegmark
used his results to discredit Penrose’s theory of consciousness.
Tegtmark noted that I also had developed a detailed theory of the mind-
brain connection, but he did not direct his remarks about decohence at my
theory. That would have made no sense, for his results are constructive
rather than destructive in the context my theory, which is based heavily on
the presumption that enviromental decoherence has a large effect on brain
processes. My theory is specifically designed so that the particular quantum
effects that allow a person’s thoughts to influence his brain are not affected by
environmental decoherence. This stringent requirement imposes non-trivial
conditions on human behavior under controlled situations, and the empirical
data gathered by psychologists during the past fifty years indicate that these
detailed conditions are satisfied.
The foregoing remarks make it clear that the macroscopic quantum ef-
fects exploited in this quantum theory of the mind-brain system are not the
macroscopic quantum effects used in quantum computation. Those latter ef-
fects are obliterated by environmental decoherence. Thus if brains really do
operate in the way described by this theory then the technical ramifications
could be far reaching: it would make available for development a type of
macroscopic quantum effect that has been exploited by biological systems,
but has not been been used in engineering. No new principle is involved here:
the theory is simply a rational consequence of taking seriously the principles
laid down by John von Neumann[2] and Eugene Wigner[3], together with
reasonable and standard ideas about what brains do.
This theory has been described in a number of documents[4] designed
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to inform neuroscientists and psychologists, but has not been described in a
physics journal, in a form directed at physicists. The purpose of this paper to
fill that void, and to show in particular how macroscopic quantum effects can
be effective in a system that is decomposed into a mixture of nearly classical
states on a time scale of 10−23 seconds. To establish that this theory is
science, not mere speculative philosophy, I shall describe at the end some of
the explanatory power of the theory.
My central task here is to explain how macroscopic quantum effects oc-
curring in the presence of massive environmental decoherence can produce an
action of mind on brain that can account for the detailed empirical facts. I
assume that there is nothing special about a human brain except for its phys-
ical structure, and hence that other systems with similar functional structure
should exhibit similar behaviour.
Many physicists are unfamiliar with the profound difference between the
von Neumann/Wigner formulation of quantum theory and the more common
Copenhagen formulation. So I will begin by describing the elements of the
von Neumann/Wigner theory, before turning first to the central theoretical
task, and then to confrontation with data.
2. The General Theory.
Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, Born, Pauli, and the other founders of quantum
theory formulated their approach in a way that constituted a radical break
with the classical physics that had preceeded it. They recognized, more
explicitly than their immediate predecessors, that science was basically a hu-
man endeavour, and they defined the proper objective of science to be the
construction of rules that would allow human beings to make useful predic-
tion about connections between their observations. Thus human experiences
were elevated to the status of the primary reality dealt with by the theory.
Physicists were enjoined to desist from all efforts to understand the real-
ity that lies behind their observations. Classical concepts were brought in
through the fact that our description of how we set up our experiments, and
what we learn from them, are—as a matter of fact—couched in the ordinary
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language of everyday life, refined by the concepts of classical physics.
This way of understanding quantum theory is called the Copenhagen
interpretation, and it is very useful: it allows physicists to get on with the
job of testing the rules and applying them, without getting embroiled in the
puzzling features that arise when one tries to dig deeper.
Von Neumann, however, did dig deeper. He noted that the measuring de-
vices, which had a rather strange dual status in the Copenhagen approach,
since they were physical objects, yet were descibed in classical language,
were made up of the same kind of atomic constituents as the atomic systems
that they were probing, and that there was therefore a well defined way to
include these devices into the system that was described by the mathemat-
ical formulas of quantum theory, provided one brought into this description
the entire physical universe, including our bodies and brains. This math-
ematical description was thereby elevated from its former status of being
merely the language for the formulation of a mysterious set of rules for mak-
ing predictions about our conscious experiences, to the status of a new kind
of description of the physical universe. However, this description, unlike its
classical predecessor, was dynamically linked to our conscious experiences.
This dynamical linkage between the aspects of nature that were described
in this mathematical language and the aspects of nature that we describe as
the contents of our streams of conscious thoughts allowed physicists to ob-
tain from a single unified theory all the predictions of Copenhagen quantum
theory and all the valid prediction of classical physical theory from a dynam-
ical theory that describes also the interaction between our minds and our
brains. The key dynamical interaction is a change, in conjunction with each
conscious experience, in the mathematically described universe: this change,
called a ‘reduction’ or a ‘collapse’, tends to eliminate all those potentialities
of the previously existing state that are incompatible with the expectations
that characterize that experience.
This “reduction of the wave packet” is the basis of Copenhagen quan-
tum theory. But von Neumann/Wigner quantum theory shifts the effect of
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the reduction associated with a person’s experience away from some exter-
nal system, such as the measured atomic system, or the external measuring
device, onto that person’s brain. This placement is, from a scientific point
of view, a far more reasonable positioning of the action of mind on matter,
at least if one is trying to construct a theory of what is really happening.
This placement creates the basis for a dynamical theory of how our conscious
thoughts influence our brains. On the other hand, no commitment need be
made as to the underlying connections between the realities that we describe
as elements of our streams of conscious thoughts and the aspects of nature
represented by the mathematical description of the physical world. For this
theory is, in the final analysis, just a theory of the interplay between the
aspects of nature that we describe in these two different ways, regardless of
the true nature of the underlying realities.
To express these ideas in mathematical form let S(t) represent the state of
the universe at time t. Actually, the variable t labels a sequence Tomonaga-
Schwinger[5] spacelike surfaces σ(t) such that the whole surface moves grad-
ually forward as t increases. I assume that for the study of brain dynamics
quantum electro-dynamics will be adequate for the pertinent ranges of size
and energies, and that future developments in elementary-particle physics
will provide the necessary ultra-violet cut-off. I am imagining, for definite-
ness, that the surfaces σ(t) will be the constant-time surfaces in the rest
frame of the cosmic background radiation.
The state S(t) is the operator form of the state: S(t)/TrS(t) is the usual
‘density matrix’, where Tr stands for the trace operation.
The operator S can be represented by a matrix Sij. If the system repre-
sented by Sij is composed of n component parts, then the index i will consist
of a sequence of n indices, and j will also be represented in this way. If b
is the set of indices labelling some critical part of some person’s brain, and
−b represents the complementary set of indices—i.e., the set of indices for
rest of the universe—, then the state of this brain part, is represented by
S(t)b = Tr−bS(t), which is the partial trace of S(t) over the complementary
4
set of variables −b. This operator S(t)b acts in the subspace of indices b
associated with this brain part.
The basic problem to be faced is that the interaction of the brain with
its environment will keep S(t)b in the form of a mixture of almost classical
states, and that this would seem, on the face of it, to preclude macroscopic
quantum effects of the kind needed for a quantum-mediated influence of mind
on brain.
To see why that is not true one must understand what the brain is doing.
The job of the brain is basically to take clues, coming via sensors, about
the situation of the body in its environment, and construct an appropriate
plan of action, and then to initiate and supervise the execution of this plan.
I assume that the evolutionary process has honed the properties of the mind-
brain so that it performs this task well.
How do quantum effects enter into the behaviour of S(t)b?
There is, of course, the basic fact that quantum theory is needed to make
the chemistry work right. But in order to get directly to the essential point
let me grant that the chemical interactions could be mocked up by some
essentially classical-type model, and that the whole brain can be treated
classically except for one thing: the migration of calcium ions within nerve
terminals from the exits of micro-channels to the sites where they trigger the
release into the synaptic cleft the contents of vesicles of neurotransmitter.
The diameters of the micro-channels in cerebral nerve terminals are ap-
proximately one nm [6], This means that the indeterminacy in the velocity
of the migrating calcium ion that arises from the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle is smaller than its thermal velocity by a factor of about 300. The
distance between microchannel exit and trigger site is about 50nm [7]. Thus
the uncertainty in the location of the calcium ion when it reaches the trigger
site is of the order of size of the calcium ion itself. This means that the clas-
sical conception of the brain is inadequate in principle: quantum effects will
generate a superposition of the classical state in which the neurotransmitter
in the vesicle is released and the classical state in which this packet of neu-
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rotransmitter is not released. This superposition will quickly be reduced to
a mixture. A similar bifurcation occurs at each active nerve terminal. Hence
the state S(t)b will necessarily evolve into a mixture of a huge number of
states. Actually, a continuum of possible states will contribute, because each
vesicle could be released a little earlier or a little later, and this will produce
a continuum of contributing possibilities.
This first step is already important, because it shows that the idea that
classical physics could give a deterministic answer to how the brain evolves
is in principle wrong: that possibility is strictly incompatible with quantum
theory, even if one ignores quantum effects associated with chemistry. Quan-
tum effects entail that the brain state S(t)b will quickly evolve onto a mixture
of quasi-classical possibilities, all of which are actually present, insofar as no
actual collapse has occurred. It is important in what follows that the inter-
action with the environment, although it reduces superpositions to mixtures
does it not reduce the mixture of quasi classical possibilities to a single one
of these possibilies: all states of the mixture will continue to exist in parallel,
insofar as the evolution is controlled by the Schroedinger equation.
It is, of course, well known that if one computes the expectation value
of any operator in a state S that is a mixture of states S ′ then the result is
identical to what would be obtained if the state were really in just one of the
states S ′, but that one does not know which state S ′ this is, but does know
the probability of each of the states S ′.
This fact might suggest that there could be no way to distinguish a quan-
tum model of the brain from a classical statistical model. However, that
conclusion is incorrect, within the von Neumann/Wigner framework.
Within this vN/W framework each alert person has a stream of conscious
experiences, and each such experience is associated with a reduction of the
state of his brain to a form that is compatible with the experience: the
reduction eliminates from the state of the brain all patterns of activity that
are incompatible with that experience.
This reduction is represented mathematically in the following way. Each
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experience E is associated with a projection operator P (E), and the occur-
rence of E at time t has the following effect: if the symbol t− signifies the
action of taking the limit in which the argument of S(t′) tends to time t from
times earlier than t, and t+ is related in the same way to later times, then
S(t+)b = P (E)S(t−)bP (E). (1)
The projection operator P(E) acts in the subspace associated with the indices
b, and satisfies the defining condition for projection operators P (E)2 = P (E).
It acts on the brain state S(t)b to eliminate all patterns of activity or structure
that are incompatible with E.
For example, if the experience E is an updating of the person’s represen-
tation of the world, then P(E) will preserve in the mixture of quasi-classical
states S ′ represented by S(t)b just those that contain the patterns of brain
activity that will tend to etch into memory the experienced updating. If the
experience is of an intention to cause one’s body to move in a certain way
then P(E) will eliminate from the mixture S(t)b those quasi-classical states
S ′ that do not have the patterns of brain activity that will tend to cause the
body to move in this way. These rules are just the analogs in the vN/W
framework of the Copenhagen rule that the reduction is to the state that
is compatible with the experience. But in the vN/W framework it may be
supposed that this linkage of each experience E with a P (E) that tends to
produce the expected or intended future experiences is a consequence of the
evolutionary development of the human system.
In any attempt to go beyond the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory the chief problem is the so-called “Basis Problem”: What determines
which basis will be used to reduce the myriads of possibilities produced by
the quantum uncertainties to the individual reality that is experienced? En-
vironmental decoherence is helpful, but it is not sufficient, because the quasi-
classical states are over-complete, and hence do not provide a unique basis
of normalizable states, and the structure of conscious experience is tied to
the formation of quasi-stable and accessible memories, as Zurek emphasizes
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in his excellent reviews [8].
Copenhagen quantum theory resolves the basis problem in a simple way:
“The Observer”, who stands outside the Hilbert space structure, decides how
he will set up the experiments, and this decision fixes the “basis”. This means
that in the Copenhagen interpretation it is the ‘free choice’ on the part of
the experimenter as to what he is interested in that fixes the basis.
The vN/W solution is essentially the same as the Copenhagen one: the
basis is fixed by the experience of “the observer”. Something beyond the
Schroedinger evolution is needed to fix the basis, and this is taken to be
“experience”.
But then what fixes experience? How is E determined? And how does
‘free choice’ enter? The experience E cannot just pop out of nothing: it must
be determined largely by the brain. Any adequate dynamical theory of the
mind-brain must explain not only how mind effects brain, but also how brain
affects mind.
The job of the mind and brain, acting together, is to determine the best
course of action in the circumstances in which the mind-brain finds itself.
The brain is busy grinding out, via the Schroedinger equation, the host of
possibilities represented by the mixture S(t)b. The ‘best’ option should be
the one such that P (E) has the greatest statistical weight. Let E(t) be the
E that maximizes TrS(t)bP (E). This should be the best candidate for E at
time t.
But the experiential events in the person’s stream of consciousness oc-
cur only at discrete times, not continuously. Thus the ‘free choice’ can
be reduced to consent, at certain instants t, to put to Nature the ques-
tion of whether experience E(t) will occur. If E(t) does occur then S(t+)
becomes P ′(E(t))S(t−)P ′(E(t)), in accordance with (1). If Nature’s an-
swer is No, and hence E(t) does not occur at time t, then S(t) becomes
(1−P ′(E(t)))S(t−)(1−P ′(E(t))), where the operator P ′(E(t)) in these ex-
pressions is the trivial extension to the entire space of the operator P (E(t))
defined previously. The probability that the experience E(t) will occur is
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given by
TrS(t)P ′(E(t))/TrS(t) = TrbS(t)bP (E(t))/TrbS(t)b. (2)
in accordance with the the basic probabilty rule of quantum theory.
The point of all this is that Copenhagen quantum theory introduced our
conscious experiences directly into physical theory, and von Neumann/Wigner
quantum theory tied these experiences to projection operators that act on
the person’s brain state in such a way as to bring the brain state into con-
cordance with the experience. This converts quantum theory basically into
a dynamical theory of the evolution of the universe that includes a theory of
mind-brain interaction.
In this theory behaviour is largely controlled by the local mechanical brain
process governed by the Schroeodinger equation. That process is ‘local’: the
interactions are basically contact interactions. But there is one element that
not governed by any known law of physics, namely the choices to consent or
not consent at time t to putting to nature the question associated with the
possible experience E(t).
I do not intend to speculate at this point about how the evaluation that
lies behind this choice is carried out. At the present early stage in the de-
velopment of the science of the mind-brain system that question remains a
project for future research. But the effect of a consent to ‘put the question
to nature’, is to force Nature to return an answer, Yes or No, and the effect
of the answer ‘Yes’, is to activate the process (2), which tends to produce
to updating or action that characterizes the experience. This “reduction” of
“collapse” process is macroscopic, in the sense that, according to the theory,
the operator P (E(t)) acts instantaneously on some large part of the brain
in accordance with process (1) descrbed above. I presume that the evalu-
ation process has been honed by evolution so that it reflects the the likely
consequences of activating process (1).
But in order for evolution to be able to hone this connection it is necessary
that one’s choice to consent has a likely effect on behaviour.
9
In order to compute the likely effects on behaviour one must add the
properly weighted contributions from the two possible answers that nature
might give. This is exactly what the famous von Neumann process 1 achieves:
it gives the state that represents the effect of putting to nature the question
P = P (E(t)) if no account is taken of which of the two possible answers,
‘Yes’ or ‘No’, nature returns.
The von Neumann process 1 is:
S(t)b = PS(t−)bP + (1− P )S(t−)b(1− P ). (3)
So the key demand on the theory is that behaviour be controllable at the
statistical level by applications at various times t of the process (3) associated
with one’s choice to give at time t the consent associated with the possible
experience E(t). And this control should tend to produce behaviour that
conforms to the expectations and intentions imbedded in E(t)
Can one achieve this in a brain that is subject to massive effects of envi-
ronmental decoherence? That is the question. The answer is Yes.
In order to consciously control one’s behaviour one must normally keep
attention focussed on a task for some period of time. Think of the focus of
attention required to lift a heavy rock, or the focus of attention needed to
fix into memory the details of some visual scene. In these clear examples
of the apparent control of brain process by conscious effort some particular
thought, or aspect of thought, remains fixed and stable the mind-brain for
an experienced period of time. Hence we are led to consider the effect of
putting the same question repeatedly to Nature in rapid succession.
Suppose, for definiteness, that the subsystem b is a set of degrees of
freedom that is generating a contribution to the low frequency (< 40Hz)
part of the coulomb part of the elecromagnetic field in the brain, and that
the von Neuman process (3) repeats rapidly on this scale.
Let d represent the time interval between successive actions of process
(3). Then
S(t+ d)b =
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P (exp−iHd)[PS(t−)bP + (1− P )S(t−)b(1− P )](exp+iHd)P
+
(1− P )
(exp−iHd)[PS(t−)bP + (1− P )S(t−)b(1− P )](exp+iHd)
(1− P ). (4)
Because Hd is small in the subspace associated with b one can approx-
imate the exponentials by (1 ∓ iHd), and observe that the terms linear in
d drop out: the effect of a rapid repetition of process (3) is to damp out
transitions between the two subspaces specified by P and (1− P ). This will
be recognized as the familiar Quantum Zeno Effect [9].
What this means is that if a person can, by willful effort, acting through
his power to consent, increase the rapidity of the events in his stream of
consciousness then he could control the activity of his brain by keeping the
activity of the b part of it confined to the subspace it is already in. The
brain state would be prevented from “wandering” in the way that it would if
there were no rapid quantum process (3). Thus willful effort would alter the
behaviour of the quantum brain, at the statistical level, from what it would
be if there were no macroscopic quantum effects.
Note that the Quantum Zeno Effect described above is not destroyed by
the fact that S(t)b is a mixture: that makes no difference at all. The reason
that the macroscopic quantum effect persists in the presence of decoherence
is that it originates not in interference effects but rather the fact that it is
the whole brain part associated with the set of variables b that enters into
the dynamics, both at the level of specifying the ‘best’ possibility P (E(t)),
and the associated action (3).
The key point is that the quantum theory of mind-brain described here
gives each mind-brain the power, through force of will acting via consent,
to keep its attention focussed on a task in a way that is impossible in the
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analogous classical statistical model. And this effect is achieved by increasing,
through effort of will, the rate of events in the stream of consciousness.
I stress again that this theory, although it is more congenial to ontological
interpretation than the Copenhagen account, is basically just a way of orga-
nizing empirical features of the study of mind-brain systems in a way that is
suggested by, and strictly compatible with, the basic laws and principles of
physics.
3. Explanatory Power
Does this theory explain anything?
This theory was already in place [4] when a colleague brought to my
attention some passages from “Psychology: The Briefer Course”, written by
William James [25]. In the final section of the chapter on Attention James
writes:
“I have spoken as if our attention were wholly determined by neural con-
ditions. I believe that the array of things we can attend to is so determined.
No object can catch our attention except by the neural machinery. But the
amount of the attention which an object receives after it has caught our at-
tention is another question. It often takes effort to keep mind upon it. We
feel that we can make more or less of the effort as we choose. If this feeling
be not deceptive, if our effort be a spiritual force, and an indeterminate one,
then of course it contributes coequally with the cerebral conditions to the
result. Though it introduce no new idea, it will deepen and prolong the stay
in consciousness of innumerable ideas which else would fade more quickly
away. The delay thus gained might not be more than a second in duration—
but that second may be critical; for in the rising and falling considerations
in the mind, where two associated systems of them are nearly in equilibrium
it is often a matter of but a second more or less of attention at the outset,
whether one system shall gain force to occupy the field and develop itself and
exclude the other, or be excluded itself by the other. When developed it may
make us act, and that act may seal our doom. When we come to the chapter
on the Will we shall see that the whole drama of the voluntary life hinges
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on the attention, slightly more or slightly less, which rival motor ideas may
receive. ...”
In the chapter on Will, in the section entitled “Volitional effort is effort
of attention” James writes:
“Thus we find that we reach the heart of our inquiry into volition when
we ask by what process is it that the thought of any given action comes to
prevail stably in the mind.”
and later
“The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘volun-
tary,’ is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. ...
Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.”
Still later, James says:
“Consent to the idea’s undivided presence, this is effort’s sole achieve-
ment.” ...“Everywhere, then, the function of effort is the same: to keep
affirming and adopting the thought which, if left to itself, would slip away.”
This description of the effect of mind on the course of mind-brain process
is remarkably in line with what arose independently from a purely theoretical
consideration of the quantum physics of this process. The basic features of
the interplay between effort, attention, and control in the mind-brain system,
as discerned by James, seem to come naturally out of the principles that von
Neumann and Wigner promulgated in their effort to make physical sense of
the mathematical rules that explain the connections between the phenomena
from the realm of atomic physics. This opens up the interesting theoretical
possibility of bringing the whole range of science from atomic physics to mind-
brain dynamics together in a single rationally coherent theory of an evolving
physical reality made essentially of objective knowledge or information rather
than classically conceived matter.
A great deal has happened in psychology since the time of William James.
A large amount empirical work pertaining to the issues at hand has been de-
scribed in the book “The Psychology of Attention” by William Pashler [10].
This empirical work is basically behavioural: subjects are assigned multiple
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tasks of various kinds and various loads, and their performances are mea-
sured. Pashler makes a powerful case for the conclusion that brain process
is has two distinguishable subprocesses, one more analytical and perceptual
and operating via parallel processing, the other more selective of action, and
acting via a linear “bottleneck” process. The detailed features of these two
processes appear to be well explained by the quantum model of the com-
bined mind-brain system developed in this paper, with the parallel process-
ing aspect being governed by the Schroedinger equation, and the selection
bottleneck being govern by the collapse process.
I am not claiming that no classical model could explain these features.
But the fact that the details seem to be forced in the quantum approach
by the severe constraints imposed by the existence of strong environmental
decoherence makes the quantum model more theoretically attractive than a
classical model that puts these features, ad hoc, into a theoretical structure
in which consciousness can make no difference.
This journal is not the appropriate place to describe the detailed ways
in which the empirical findings described by Pashler support the theory de-
scribed above. A discussion of this matter can be found elsewhere [11].
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